BOOK REVIEWS

497

religious liberty are insecure, and have only a pragmatic, not a principled
basis. Whatever the faults of Corvino’s criticisms of religious liberty, I fear
Anderson and Girgis are committed, by their own lights, to restricting
religious liberty far more greatly than Corvino proposes. This will place
them uncomfortably close to the new Catholic integralists, who embrace
a coercive establishmentarian politics with greatly restricted religious liberty for non-Catholics.

Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will, by John Martin Fischer. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. vii + 243. $ 78 (hardcover).
ALICIA FINCH, Northern Illinois University
John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will is a compilation
of eleven previously published essays on the topic of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (where freedom is understood as the ability
to do otherwise than one does). With clear and accessible prose, Fischer
relentlessly argues for the thesis that divine foreknowledge and human
freedom are incompatible (a thesis that I will hereafter refer to as incompatibilismFF). Throughout the volume, he carefully considers various objections to his argument, paying particular attention to Ockhamism. Some
of his more recent essays (co-authored with Patrick Todd and/or Neal
Tognazzini) emphasize that the issue of explanatory dependence is central to
the debate. In the end, it seems that although Fischer is convinced by the
argument for incompatibilismFF, he is not troubled by it. Of course, no one
familiar with his work defending semi-compatibilism should be surprised:
Fischer has repeatedly argued that it is possible to be morally responsible
for one’s actions even if one lacks the freedom to do otherwise; he has
further argued that, in the light of this possibility, there is no reason to be
troubled by the lack of such freedom.
In what follows, I will summarize the previously published essays,
pausing to evaluate the version of the argument for incompatibilismFF on
which Fischer relies. I will then explain why, despite some objections, I
cannot do otherwise than recommend this book.
Over the course of the essays, Fischer considers three versions of the
argument for incompatibilismFF: the “Transfer Version,” the “Conditional
Version,” and the “Possible-Worlds Version.” In “Scotism,” Fischer critically evaluates Sir Anthony Kenny’s “Scotistic” response to a Transfer
Version of the argument, where (i) all Transfer Versions of the argument
rely (implicitly or explicitly) on so-called “transfer principles” and (ii)
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the “general feature of transfer principles is that they are what Timothy
O’Connor has called ‘modal slingshots’; they shoot a modal property from
one item to another (via a certain means).” (3) In this essay (and in the introduction), Fischer suggests that transfer principles are best avoided; he
subsequently offers a Conditional Version of the argument—an argument
that reappears, in one form or another, throughout this volume.
When presenting either the Conditional or the Possible Worlds Version of the argument for incompatibilismFF, Fischer invokes some basic
assumptions:
‘God’ [is] the name of the individual who necessarily has the Divine Attributes. For the purposes of our discussion, the key attributes are (essential)
eternality and (essential) omniscience. By ‘eternality’ I mean “sempiternality”; God exists at all times. Further, God’s omniscience implies that (for any
proposition P), God believes that P if and only if P is true. (2)

Moreover, he repeatedly asks us to suppose that “God (as conceptualized
above) exists” and that “[S]ome ordinary agent Jones does some ordinary
act X (like mowing his lawn) at time T2” (2). In addition, he notes that
“Arguably, it follows from God’s essential omniscience and eternality that
God believed at T1 that Jones would do X at T2 [where T1 is earlier than
T2]” (2). Finally, Fischer relies on some variation on the principle of the
“fixity of the past,” where this principle is, roughly, the thesis that the
past is “over and done with” and, as such, it is too late for anyone to do
anything about it.
When presenting the Conditional Version of the argument in particular, Fischer relies on a formulation of the principle of the fixity of the past
relevantly similar to this:
(FP) For any action Y, agent S, and time T, if it is true that if S were to
do Y at T, some fact about the past relative to T would not have
been a fact, then S cannot at (or just prior to) T do Y at T (5).
However, in “Power over the Past” and “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and
the Fixity of the Past,” Fischer admits that there is reason to doubt (FP).
While Fischer does not concede the falsity of (FP), he is not particularly
concerned to defend it. After all, as he points out, the argument for incompatibilismFF does not depend on the truth of (FP), even if it depends on the
truth of some principle of the fixity of the past.
With this, Fischer goes on to offer a Possible-Worlds formulation of the
principle and, of course, a Possible Worlds Version of the argument for
incompatibilismFF. The relevant principle is:
(FP*) An agent can at T do X at T only if there exists some possible world
with the same past relative to T as the actual world in which the
agent does X at T (111).
Given the preceding assumptions, it follows that:
God believed at T1 that Jones would do X at T2. Since God is essentially
omniscient, His belief at T1 that Jones does X at T2 entails that Jones does X
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at T2. By the possible-worlds definition of entailment, in all possible worlds
in which God believes at T1 that Jones would do X at T2, Jones does X at T2.
So in any possible world in which Jones does not do X at T2, God doesn’t
believe at T1 that Jones does X at T2. It follows from (FP*) that Jones does not
have it in his power at . . . T2 to refrain from X-ing at T2. (6)

Since this point about the agent Jones, his action X, the time T1, and the
later time T2 can be generalized to a point about any agent, any action,
and any two (distinct) times, the Possible Worlds Version of the argument
for incompatibilismFF is complete.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the Conditional Version of
the argument is sound only if the Possible Worlds Version is. Next, let us
consider that unless one challenges Fischer’s conception of God, the Possible Worlds Version of the argument stands or falls with (FP*). And now
let us pause to consider what this principle amounts to.
First, it seems worthwhile to note that (FP*) does not obviously capture
the notion of the fixity of the past. Within the free will literature, the “principle of the fixity of the past” usually refers to the thesis that it is no longer
up to anyone what happened in the past; this thesis is usually expressed
in terms similar to these:
(FP′): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p describes
a state of affairs that obtains prior to t, then (ii) it is not up to S at
or after t whether p.
Fischer’s (FP*), by contrast, says this:
(FP**): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p describes a state of affairs that obtains prior to t and (ii) p entails q,
then (iii) it is not up to S at or after t whether q.
(where, I take it, (FP*) and (FP**) are equivalent.)
Of course, this point is relatively minor: it’s not as if Fischer baits his
reader by arguing for (FP′) and then switches to (FP*) when he presents
his argument for incompatibilismFF. Indeed, he explicitly says that the
Possible Worlds version of the argument “gets its basic impetus from an
insight from Carl Ginet: an agent S has it in his power to do X only if it is
possible that X be an extension of the [actual] past” (6). Since Ginet’s basic
insight seems to be equivalent to (FP*), Fischer seems to be suggesting that
there is no need to argue for (FP*). Moreover, whether or not we call (FP*)
the principle of the fixity of the past, what matters is whether it is true.
This brings me to my second, more serious point about (FP*): its truth
is not as obvious to everyone as it seems to be to Fischer. One could argue
for its truth if one appealed to (FP′) and a transfer principle, e.g.:
(Transfer): For any agent S, any proposition p, and any time t, if (i) p is
true and it is not up to S at t whether p and (ii) p entails q, then
(iii) q is true and it is not up to S at t whether q.
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After all, the conjunction of (FP′) and (Transfer) obviously entails (FP**)
(which, again, I take to be equivalent to (FP*)). But Fischer emphatically
rejects this strategy, insisting that the truth of (FP*) is more obvious than
the validity of transfer principles. Moreover, he is not at all convinced that
transfer principles are valid. It is thus far better, according to Fischer, to
assess the truth of (FP*) directly instead of trying to derive it in a roundabout way.
While I certainly appreciate his strategy (including his attempt to avoid
contentious debates about the validity of transfer principles), I must confess that (FP*)’s truth is simply not obvious to me. Indeed, when I try to
evaluate (FP*) without considering the truth of (FP′) and the validity of
(Transfer), I am at a loss. I offer this autobiographical information because I
suspect that I am not the only one who is similarly confounded. Of course,
I realize that others share Fischer’s conviction that (FP*) is obviously true.
My point is this: while it may be reasonable for those who agree with
Fischer about (FP*) to endorse his claim that the Possible Worlds Version
of the argument is superior to the Transfer Version, this would not be reasonable for everyone. Those of us who find (FP*) convincing only if we derive it from principles like (FP′) and (Transfer) might reasonably conclude
that the Transfer Version of the argument for incompatibilismFF is the best
version available.
Instead of quibbling over how best to formulate the argument, though,
it is worthwhile to consider how best to respond to it. As I have already
mentioned, Fischer devotes more attention to Ockhamism than to any
other response to the argument. I want to be clear, though, that he does
not ignore other responses. For instance, in “Freedom and Actuality,” he
considers whether one could defeat the argument if one insisted that all
propositions about the future are world-indexed; he (rightly) concludes
that one could not. In “Putting Molinism in its Place,” he argues that
Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument, but rather presupposes such a response. Moreover, in “Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time” (co-authored with Patrick Todd and Neil Tognazzini),
Fischer offers a brief survey of other responses to the argument, including atemporalism (according to which God is outside of time and, hence,
does not have foreknowledge at all) and Open Theism (which he defines
as “the thesis that there are things that happen that God has not always
believed—and hence has not always known—would happen”) (168).
Again, though, the response that receives the most attention is Ockhamism. Fischer follows the convention of presenting Ockhamism in
terms of a distinction between “hard facts” and “soft facts.” Quoting Nelson Pike, Fischer characterizes a hard fact as “‘fully accomplished and
over-and-done-with’ at the relevant time” (131). A soft fact, by contrast, is
“temporally relational.” Following Alvin Plantinga, Fischer suggests that
“it is a mark of a soft fact that it entails that a certain sort of fact . . . obtains
in the future” (132). As characterized by Fischer, the “Ockhamist position
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. . . is that (a) facts which only appear to be strictly about the past but are
really also about the future do not carry the necessity of the past [i.e., they
are not “fixed”], and (b) God’s beliefs are precisely this sort of fact” (133).
So, the fact that God believes at T1 that Jones performs X at T2 is a soft
fact at T1; since it is soft fact, it is false that Jones can refrain from doing
X at T2 only if there exists some possible world in which (i) God believes
at T1 that Jones performs X at T2 and (ii) Jones refrains from performing
X at T2.
In “Ockhamism: The Facts,” Fischer argues that even if certain facts
about God’s beliefs at a time T are soft facts (at T ), these facts have “hard
features” (135). In order to illustrate this point, we can imagine that I—a
non-omniscient being—believe at T1 that Jones will do X at T2. Once T1
has passed, it certainly seems “over and done with” that I believed what
I believed at T1. Moreover, it seems that God’s mental states are enough
like ours that if God had a particular belief at T1, it is over and done with
at later times that God had that belief. Granted, God is omniscient and,
hence, God’s beliefs about the future entail that the future will be a certain
way; this is why Fischer is willing to say that it was a soft fact at T1 that
God believed Jones would do X at T2. But even if this complex fact was
soft, one feature of this fact—God’s particular mental state at T1—seems
hard, and this hardness is a problem for the Ockhamist. In “Snapshot Ockhamism,” Fischer offers an ingenious way to draw the distinction between
hard and soft facts. In the end, though, he concludes that Ockhamism
nonetheless faces insurmountable problems.
To me, Fischer’s assessment of Ockhamism seems more positive by the
time he and his co-authors write “Engaging with Pike.” Though Fischer
never endorses Ockhamism, his (co-authored) description of the position
seems richer and more nuanced than what he offered in the earlier pieces.
In particular, he and his co-authors acknowledge that “the Ockhamist
appeals to a claim concerning explanatory dependence” (170). Indeed, the
Ockhamist insists that the order of dependence is crucial: if God believed
at T1 that Jones would do X at T2, God had this belief at T1 because of what
Jones does at T2; in contrast, Jones does not do X at T2 because of what
God believed at T1. Moreover, “According to Ockhamist thinking, if one
has the power to bring about that something is the case, then one has the
power to bring it about that it always was the case that it would be the case”
(170). From here, Fischer and his co-authors argue that if Ockhamism is
tenable, eternalism is true, where “Eternalism is the thesis that past, present, and future objects all equally exist” (174). (I note that in the introduction to the volume, Fischer suggests that he and Todd have changed their
minds about the relationship between eternalism and Ockhamism, but he
does not explain why, exactly, they have done so. To me, this seems like a
frustrating omission.)
In “The Truth about Freedom” and “The Truth about Foreknowledge,”
Fischer and co-author Patrick Todd respond to Trenton Merricks’s charge
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that the basic argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge
and freedom is question-begging. They also criticize Merricks’s discussion
of Ockhamism, suggesting that he has fundamentally misunderstood the
position.
In the final essay reprinted here, “Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence,” Fischer and Neal Tognazzini argue that the responses to the argument for incompatibilismFF offered by Storrs McCall, Trenton Merricks,
and Jonathan Westphal are failures of philosophical engagement. According to Fischer and Tognazzini, these responses amount to little more than
asserting that the argument is invalid or that one of the premises is false.
In the spirit of charity, they suggest that perhaps these responses should
be construed as either (i) attempts to motivate a “Moorean shift,” whereby
they are suggesting that we ought to be more confident in the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge than we are in the soundness of the
argument or (ii) Ockhamism by another name. Either way, they suggest,
their interlocutors fail to offer a new philosophical response to the argument: the former is not really a philosophical response at all; the latter
response is not new.
Given that (with the exception of the introduction) each essay included
here has been previously published, one might question the wisdom of
purchasing this volume. As I see it, the purchase is worthwhile for several
reasons. First, some of Fischer’s work on incompatibilismFF is not easily
available elsewhere. Second, it is convenient to have his most important
papers on the topic gathered together in one place. Indeed, I can imagine
an excellent course on freedom and foreknowledge that uses this volume
and the 2014 volume he co-edited with Patrick Todd (Freedom, Fatalism,
and Foreknowledge, Oxford) as the central texts. Moreover, by reading the
papers in the order in which he presents them, one can gain insight into
the progression of Fischer’s thought and note the apparent influences of
Todd and Tognazzini. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the introductory essay is outstanding. Fischer provides a comprehensive introduction not only to his own work on incompatibilismFF, but to the debate in
general. As I have already suggested, the introduction brings his work
on incompatibilismFF into conversation with his extensive work on semicompatibilism. Perhaps most strikingly, he argues for the novel thesis that
it is possible for God to be certain that a particular event will occur, even
if that event occurs indeterministically (and, hence, is not determined to
occur by the past, present, and the laws of nature), and even if God does
not have direct apprehension of future events. While I myself was not
convinced by the argument, I cannot deny that it was both clever and interesting, and that it demands a response.
In the acknowledgements, Fischer thanks Neal Tognazzini and Patrick
Todd for encouraging him to put together this volume. In my view, anyone working on freedom and foreknowledge owes Tognazzini and Todd
a debt of gratitude, because we should all be grateful that this book exists.

